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MORAL HAZARD AS A
CONTRIBUTING FACTOR TO
WORKER ABSENTEEISM IN SWEDEN
Augustine M. Ripa
Introduction
Social insurance policies in Sweden pro-
vide benefits for individuals suffering from
medical conditions that reduce their working
capacity. These benefits are designed to help
alleviate financial pressures felt from personal
income reduction due to this reduced working
capacity: workers absent due to sickness collect
cash disbursements in place of earned income.
In this manner, the social insurance programs
subsidize worker absenteeism. Historically, the
scope of this effort has increased and decreased
as worker absenteeism levels have fluctuated
substantially in the past. (“Social Insurance in
Sweden 2003”) For a variety of reasons, includ-
ing the effects on social insurance expenditure
and labor supply, it is important to understand
what contributes to these fluctuations. 
In this article, I explore the role of one
contributing factor to describe its influence on
worker absenteeism: moral hazard. This is a sig-
nificant point, since from my personal experi-
ence in Sweden and in conducting research, 
I have seldom seen a candid exploration of this
phenomenon to describe trends in worker
absenteeism. I provide an in-depth look at the
structure of the Swedish social insurance 
system, followed by a detailed explanation of
moral hazard phenomena which provides suit-
able background for this investigation. I then
examine research documenting the existence
of moral hazard’s influence on worker absen-
teeism in Sweden in general. Finally, I present
a closer look at absenteeism trends in Sweden
since 1998 as a case study to further demon-
strate moral hazard’s link to worker absen-
teeism.
The Welfare State and Social
Insurance in Sweden
Sweden is internationally recognized for
its implementation of one of the world’s most
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comprehensive welfare states. The expanse of
Sweden’s welfare program is truly vast and has
earned a reputation for providing its citizens
with so-called “cradle-to-grave” support. These
welfare policies interest many scholars and pol-
icymakers, particularly in light of Sweden’s
embrace of capitalism and success in industry:
Swedish companies include a long list of indus-
try giants such as Electrolux and ABB. This
dichotomy of business prowess and welfare
sophistication has become a key characteristic
of Sweden.
Sweden’s welfare state embodies what is
referred to as an ideal welfare system; the state
administers “comprehensive and universal wel-
fare for its citizens.” (“An Introduction to Social
Policy,” p. 1) These welfare provisions are more
generous than those of other industrialized
nations, such as Britain, France, Germany, and
the United States. The extent of Sweden’s wel-
fare coverage stems from its gravitation towards
an institutional welfare system that addresses
need as a fact of normal life. Swedish welfare
support therefore transcends typical socioeco-
nomic boundaries and becomes a part of life for
all citizens — both rich and poor. (“An
Introduction to Social Policy”) Social insurance
in Sweden, encompassing programs such as
child-care benefits, retirement pensions, and
sickness and disability insurance, stands out as
one of the country’s most noteworthy welfare
policies. Although the scope of coverage is
large, all social insurance programs embrace
the same general mission: ensuring the finan-
cial security of citizens. Sweden’s National
Social Insurance Board describes these pro-
grams as follows:
The purpose of social insurance is to
afford security for families with
young children, in illness and dis-
ability, and in old age. The purpose
of these benefits is also to even out
economic conditions between child
families and households without
young children, and to spread eco-
nomic resources over the life cycle.
(“Social Insurance Expenditure in
Sweden 2001–2004,” p. 7)
The Standing Committee on Social Insurance,
a permanent committee of the Swedish
Riksdag, or parliament, administers the social
insurance effort. The committee’s responsibil-
ities include the management of many aspects
of the social insurance system, including one
category called “financial security during ill-
ness and disability.” (Sveriges Riksdag) This cat-
egory refers to the government’s effort to pre-
vent citizens from undue financial hardship
during worker absence caused by poor health.
The benefits provided under this system are
defined as a percentage of previously earned
salary; thus, both wealthier and less wealthy
Swedes are protected under a universal plan of
coverage. This adds another level of meaning to
social insurance. 
Any Swedish citizen earning an annual
income greater than or equal to 6,000 SEK has
rights to social insurance disbursements in the
event of an injury or illness that limits working
capability. (“Social Insurance in Sweden”) The
circumstances of any such condition are irrel-
evant to the type and amount of coverage
received. An employee could injure himself off
duty while pursuing leisure activities in his
spare time, for example, and still qualify for
these provisions. (“The Swedish Labour
Market...”) The National Insurance Act and the
Act on Sick Pay elaborate details regarding the
administration of insurance benefits. (“The
Swedish Labour Market...”) Currently, employ-
ers are required to pay for the first fourteen days
of employee illness; but if illness persists beyond
this point, the government assumes payment
of the employee’s benefits. This payment can be
supplemented by private agreements between
employee, employer, and a labor union.
Although these private benefits usually cease
after one year, public benefits can continue well
beyond that point. The Swedish government
currently compensates workers up to 80 per-
cent of their previously earned income,
although less compensation is possible depend-
ing on the degree to which one’s working capac-
ity is affected. (“Social Insurance in Sweden
2003”) Combined, the private and government
benefits generally bring total income compen-
sation to 90 percent of previous income. (“The
Swedish Labour Market...”) 
Once an employee’s need for sickness ben-
efits becomes a long-term condition, it is pos-
sible for the individual to be switched to dis-
ability insurance. Sick leave patients whose
condition is deemed to persist for at least one
95
year are typically reviewed for disability status,
which can be granted on a permanent basis if
necessary. (“Social Insurance in Sweden 2003”)
In sum, worker absenteeism in Sweden can be
compensated generously under either sickness
or disability insurance — both of which are
forms of social insurance. 
What is Moral Hazard?
To examine moral hazard as an active force
in Sweden’s social insurance program, a work-
ing definition of moral hazard must be estab-
lished. Moral hazard can quickly be described
as the “tendency of insurance to change behav-
ior,” but this brief definition does not encom-
pass the full scope of the term. (“Insurance”)
Since moral hazard is so closely tied to the eco-
nomics of insurance, a brief description of
insurance will help solidify moral hazard as a
concept. 
Insurance is any means by which the con-
sequences of risk are reduced. (“Economics 
A–Z…”) For example, risk can be pooled over a
large group of individuals through contribu-
tions to a fund. Each individual has a particu-
lar chance of experiencing the adverse conse-
quences of a certain risk, and thus the number
of individuals expected to be struck by said risk
can be determined. This allows fund managers
to set required individual contributions to pro-
vide the fund with adequate means to compen-
sate those stricken individuals. In this manner,
each person can avoid the financial conse-
quences of risk by paying only a fraction of the
costs associated with those consequences. This
is illustrated in the following general example:
If one out of 1000 homes will burn
each year, and if each person con-
tributes to a general fund 1/1000 of
the value of his home, the fund will
have enough (ignoring administra-
tive expenses and the question of
whether expensive homes are more
or less likely to burn than cheap
homes) to reimburse those whose
homes burn down. (“Insurance”)
In certain instances, the specific nature of an
individual’s insurance, in combination with the
associated costs of a given risk’s consequences,
creates economic incentives for an individual
to experience those consequences. In other
words, if payments from an insurance fund
exceed the financial cost incurred by misfor-
tune, then individuals have the economic
incentive to seek out that misfortune. Home
insurance provides a good example to illustrate
this point. If a home is worth $100,000 but an
insurance fund will reimburse the individual
$150,000 in the event of disaster, an economic
incentive now exists to experience that disaster.
In this case, the individual lacks incentive to
steer clear of a potential calamity and may in
fact act to induce it. Such a change in behavior
induced by the presence of an insurance agree-
ment is a moral hazard phenomenon.
(“Insurance”)
Moral hazard sometimes manifests itself
in extreme forms, but quite frequently reveals
itself in more subtle ways. It is true that health
insurance can create incentives in favor of
injury or illness, but it would be absurd to
assume that all insured individuals seek physi-
cal harm to reap these benefits. Although doc-
umented cases of such behavior do exist, moral
hazard also embodies a much softer side of
behavior modification. This phenomenon can
be as subtle as an individual’s redefinition of tol-
erable pain. For example, suppose a worker
experiences minor back pain as part of his daily
life, but under his current insurance situation
deems the pain small enough to continue
reporting to work. Now, suppose that the insur-
ance status of this worker changes so that this
pain can be easily classified as an insurable ill-
ness, and thus the worker’s condition would be
covered under the new insurance plan. An
incentive exists for the worker to take advan-
tage of the insurance program, cite this pain as
a cause for his absence from work, and collect
insurance benefits from home. The worker’s
decision is dictated by the more favorable incen-
tives created through a new insurance program
rather than a change in his medical need; this
is moral hazard. 
In Sweden, an example of moral hazard
could follow the preceding anecdote very close-
ly, with a worker using his pain to claim sick-
ness benefits instead of going to work. If this
pain persists, the employee could even be con-
sidered for disability status and permanent
income support. Another moral hazard phe-
nomenon that could occur in Sweden involves
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the incentive to exit sickness insurance pro-
grams. Suppose an injury incurred by an
employee limits working capacity to a degree
that qualifies him for sickness or disability ben-
efits. The employee is now faced with the pos-
sibility of rehabilitation to re-enter the work-
force. Now, suppose the social insurance
income compensation, which has significantly
reduced his economic incentive to return to
work, in turn alters this employee’s rehabilita-
tion efforts. In other words, the employee pur-
sues reintegration into the workforce with a
slightly reduced fervor due to the presence and
generosity of his sickness insurance. This is also
moral hazard — the employee is using the gen-
erosity of the sickness benefits to stretch his
sick leave stay beyond what he would under a
less generous benefit package. Both of these
hypothetical instances are examples of how
moral hazard phenomena could exert influence
on worker absenteeism in Sweden. I now dis-
cuss research that goes beyond the boundaries
of such speculation and documents specific
instances of moral hazard phenomena in
Sweden.
Documented Moral Hazard in Sweden
Worker absenteeism in Sweden is most
certainly affected by a variety of complex con-
tributing factors. Commonly cited examples of
such factors include trends in worker health,
quality of working environment, forms of
employment and working hours of Swedish
employees, the onset of psychological stress in
work and private life, and/or the state of the
Swedish economy. A substantial body of
research and thought is dedicated to the explo-
ration of these issues and their relation to
Swedish worker absenteeism. Below, however,
I present evidence documenting moral hazard’s
effect on Swedish worker absenteeism, as the
purpose of this article is to demonstrate its con-
tribution to absenteeism trends. This evidence
does not diminish the role of other contribut-
ing factors, but it does show a clear link
between moral hazard and the incidence of
worker absenteeism in Sweden. 
Henrekson and Persson show that incen-
tives created by Sweden’s insurance programs
dictate a behavioral response that fluctuates
corresponding to the nature of those incentives.
Their work correlates absenteeism levels with
administrative changes in the structure of
Sweden’s social insurance regulations.
(Henrekson and Persson) Utilizing data from
1955 to 1999, they compare numbers of sick
days over a given period with the generosity of
sickness compensation over that same period.
Specifically, a regulation change in 1991, which
significantly reduced initial compensation 
levels, is cited as causing large subsequent
decreases in the number of sickness cases.
(Henrekson and Persson) In general, Henrek-
son and Persson find a strong positive correla-
tion between the generosity of sick leave bene-
fits and the amount of sick leave. 
According to our regression analyses
there appears, in most cases, to be
strong effects on sick leave behavior
from changes in sick leave compen-
sation levels. When the insurance
system is made more generous, the
aggregate number of sick days
increases, and when the system is
made more austere, the number falls.
(Henrekson and Persson, p. 27)
These findings, through their demonstration of
behavioral adaptation to incentives, clearly
demonstrate moral hazard in the Swedish social
insurance system. The historical timeline of the
data suggests that moral hazard has expressed
itself in the Swedish social insurance system for
some time.
In another study, Larsson examines the
rate at which unemployed Swedes seek sick
leave benefits. While unemployed, Swedish cit-
izens receive unemployment benefits from the
government for a limited period of time. If a
Swede falls ill while unemployed, he can claim
sickness benefits as he would if working and
receive sickness compensation based on previ-
ous income. It is important to note that sick-
ness benefits are not time constrained and are
usually greater than the unemployment bene-
fits. (Larsson) Larsson finds that unemployed
individuals claim sickness benefits at higher
rates as the duration of their unemployment
compensation expires. As Larsson explains:
...SI [sickness insurance] benefits are
used as a means to save UI [unem-
ployment insurance] benefit days,
and thus, to postpone the drop in
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income after all of the UI benefit days
are used. The need to postpone
becomes more obvious as the expi-
ration date approaches, thereby
increasing the willingness to report
sick on the few UI benefit days that
remain. (Larsson, p. 26)
This is another example of incentives dictating
individuals’ behavior. Here, incentives created
by a disparity between two insurance programs
are acted upon to postpone income loss. This,
again, is moral hazard.
Still other studies have explored the rela-
tionship between job security and worker
absenteeism due to sickness. Hesselius estab-
lishes that increases in the frequency and dura-
tion of sick leave stays correspond to an
increased risk of unemployment. (Hesselius) He
maintains that these results suggest that “less
absence-prone workers are more likely to
remain employed in a recession” and that such
a relationship “may in part explain the pro-
cyclical pattern of aggregate Swedish sick
absence rates.” (Hesselius, p. 1) These findings
suggest that insurance behavior is partially dic-
tated by incentives created by an individual’s
job security and that times of decreased job
security, such as high unemployment, are
accompanied by decreased sick leave. Arai and
Thoursie also investigate this issue by explor-
ing relationships between sick leave and
employment status. Employees under tempo-
rary employment contracts experience less job
security than do permanently contracted
employees due to the structure of Swedish labor
laws. (Arai and Thoursie) The data show a
strong negative correlation between an indus-
try sector’s sick rate and its percentage of work-
ers with temporary contracts. (Arai and
Thoursie) Again, this evidence suggests that an
employee’s decision to report sick is influenced
by the incentives or disincentives created by job
security and not solely by medical need —
another manifestation of moral hazard in
Sweden.
In another study, Thoursie correlates the
frequency of short-term sick leave with the
coincidence of popular sporting events to illus-
trate a more egregious example of moral haz-
ard in Sweden. (Thoursie) In this study, the
1987 world championship skiing competition
and the 1988 Winter Olympic Games serve as
tests to compare short-term sick leave rates
immediately before, during, and after popular
sporting events. The data yield a higher inci-
dence of sick leave among men during the
sporting events than during the time periods
before or after. As Thoursie explains:
[Y]ounger male workers abused the
sickness insurance system.... If work-
ers abuse the system to watching
[sic] sports, such behavior might also
prevail for other reasons, such as
hobbies. The two events considered
here were of very short duration.
Aggregated over a year and consid-
ering various types of events which
take place during regular working
time, the effects might precipitate
considerable losses in production
and productivity, as well as substan-
tial costs to the sickness insurance
system. (Thoursie, p. 15)
This observed behavior pattern serves as one of
the most conspicuous documented examples of
moral hazard in Sweden. In this case, workers
are reporting sick and utilizing social insurance
protection via the reduced disincentives to 
be absent for the purpose of pursuing leisure
activities.
In light of this supporting evidence, it
becomes clear that moral hazard may be an
important component to Swedish worker
absenteeism trends. In each case, the present-
ed research links the incidence of worker absen-
teeism to moral hazard phenomena. It is also
evident that moral hazard is not a new influ-
ence in Sweden, as Henrekson’s data which
span from 1955–99 attest. For a specific exam-
ple, I now closely examine the patterns of
absenteeism in Sweden since 1998 as a case
study to demonstrate how moral hazard could
be considered a contributing factor to worker
absenteeism. 
Case Study: Recent Trends in Worker
Absenteeism
As mentioned in the introduction, work-
er absenteeism in Sweden has experienced a
number of rising and declining trends in recent
history. For example, worker absenteeism lev-
els were very high in the late 1980s, fell sharply
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during the early to mid-1990s, only to rise again
since 1998. These trends are evident in Figure
1, which displays the number of newly granted
disability pensions and paid sick days over the
period of 1990–2002. To demonstrate how
moral hazard can be considered a contributing
factor to current trends in Sweden, I examine
the nature of the most recent upward trend,
which began in 1998. 
An increasing trend in worker absen-
teeism due to rising long-term sick leave and
disability began in 1998 and continues to date.
By 2002 the average duration of a sick leave
spell climbed to 124 days in men and 132 in
women, and the total number of paid sickness
benefit days reached 110 million nationally. In
the same year, the total number of persons on
sick leave exceeding 60 days rose to 269,500.
This is a 120 percent increase from 1996.
(“Social Insurance in Sweden 2003”) Disability
numbers have risen in a similar manner.
Between 1998 and 2002, the number of newly
granted disability pensions increased by at least
66 percent in men and 100 percent in women.
(“Social Insurance in Sweden 2003”) As would
be expected, trends in social insurance expen-
diture have followed a similar pattern. (“Social
Insurance Expenditure 2001–2004…”) There is
also a shift in the type of expenditure, with
increasing emphasis on sickness cash dis-
bursement and disability pension benefits. This
expenditure pattern is consistent with the
increasing number of annual paid sick days and
disability pensions that have given rise to work-
er absenteeism figures. The relation of social
insurance expenditure patterns, illustrated in
Figure 2, to worker absenteeism provides a
good demonstration of the importance of
understanding all possible contributing factors
to worker absenteeism trends. 
Why has worker absenteeism experienced
steady increases in Sweden since 1998?
Although this question may be difficult or
impossible to answer fully, certain evidence
suggests that moral hazard phenomena are, at
least in part, contributing to these trends. As
reported by Henrekson and Persson, 1998 saw
a reform in the sickness insurance system that
included the first increases in sickness benefits
in over a decade; the last benefit increases
occurred in the insurance reforms of 1987.
(Henrekson and Persson) This is consistent
with Henrekson and Persson’s conclusion
regarding the positive correlation of worker
absenteeism to benefit generosity, although
their data end in 1999 and do not consider the
most recent trends. 
The types of worker injury most responsi-
ble for the recent increases in worker absen-
teeism also provide a good example to illustrate
the link between moral hazard phenomena and
the current incidence of worker absenteeism.
Figure 1
Trends in Sickness and Disability
Source: Stockholm International in Sweden 2003.
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Worker injury in Sweden is classified into two
different categories: occupational accident and
occupational disease. Occupational accidents
cover acute conditions, such as a laceration,
while occupational diseases include more
chronic ailments, such as stress-related illness.
(“The Swedish Labour Market...”) These two
injury categories have behaved differently in
recent years, with occupational accidents
increasing by seven percent and occupational
diseases increasing by 36 percent between 1998
and 2000. (“More Musculoskeletal...”) This dis-
proportional growth is important because occu-
pational diseases have a far greater potential
impact on the sickness insurance system; they
are associated with much longer sick leave
spells. (“More Musculoskeletal...”) It is these
cases of longer worker illness that have 
the highest likelihood of evolving into a 
disability pension, and result in high cost for
the social insurance system. (“Social Insurance
in Sweden 2003”) Those occupational diseases
typically responsible for the longest periods 
of worker incapacitation are musculoskeletal
disorders, characterized by injuries to the
body’s soft tissues, such as muscles, nerves, 
tendons, or joints, and are the result of a chron-
ic condition rather than an acute incident.
(“Musculoskeletal Disorders...”) Coincidentally,
it is an increase in these disorders that has
fueled the rise of occupational disease in
Sweden and, in turn, overall sick leave. As stat-
ed in a 2002 report, “The increase in sick leave
in connection with musculoskeletal disorders
is alarming and indicates that the rise in long-
term sick leave is strongly linked to these dis-
orders.” (“More Musculoskeletal...,” p. 24)
Sweden therefore faces an increase in overall
worker absenteeism fueled by the rising preva-
lence of musculoskeletal disorders — the ill-
ness associated with the highest levels of work-
er incapacitation. In light of this, a link between
recent worker absenteeism trends and moral
hazard can be established if a link between mus-
culoskeletal disorders and moral hazard does
exist. I now present research that describes
such a link.
In general, musculoskeletal disorders and
other chronic pain diseases are notoriously dif-
ficult to diagnose. In a statement presented to
the Appropriations Subcommittee on Labor,
Health and Human Services, Education by the
American Association of Orthopaedic Surgeons,
musculoskeletal disorders were described as 
follows:
Large numbers of patients who suf-
fer from low back pain, wrist tender-
ness, shoulder aching, knee distress,
or heel discomforts have no observ-
Figure 2
Expenditure towards Financial Security in Sickness and Disability
Source: Stockholm International Expenditure 2001–2004….
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able objective findings. That fact does
not mean their problems are not real.
It does make diagnosing and study-
ing those problems challenging.
(Statement...)
This means that there is a certain amount of
subjectivity in the diagnosis and treatment of
musculoskeletal disorders. Therefore, it is rea-
sonable to identify this subjectivity as possibly
linking these particular disorders to moral haz-
ard phenomena. Studies conducted in Canada
and the United States support this.
Research conducted on Canada’s social
welfare and health insurance programs associ-
ates the incidence of musculoskeletal disorders
with both benefit generosity and stringency of
medical screening. (Campolieti) The data illus-
trate a significant positive relationship between
the frequency of musculoskeletal disorder
claims and the relative generosity of benefits in
study areas. Also, the frequencies of muscu-
loskeletal disorders were found to be inversely
correlated to stringency of medical screening
required to qualify for benefits. (Campolieti)
These data suggest that musculoskeletal disor-
ders become more prevalent with increasing
economic incentives to use the health insur-
ance program, and less prevalent with increas-
ing stringency of medical examinations.
Data from the United States also link mus-
culoskeletal disorders to moral hazard. In his
study exploring HMO insurance incentives and
moral hazard effects on injury reporting, Butler
comments on the subjective nature of muscu-
loskeletal disorders as contributing to moral
hazard phenomena:
Because it is difficult to diagnose
potentially work debilitating injuries
(such as low back sprains and
strains), moral hazard may affect fre-
quency of claims. Even if an incident
is known to have happened with cer-
tainty, it can be difficult to monitor
the extent of the injury. Therefore
moral hazard may also affect the
reported severity of the injury.
(Butler et al., 1997, pp. 192–93)
In another study, Butler examines the moral
hazard effects on increased soft-tissue injury
claims in the United Sates. As he concludes,
“We find evidence that moral hazard response
explains most of the 30% increase in the pro-
portion of soft-tissue injuries during the 1980s.”
(Butler et al., 1996, p. 1) These findings, as do
those of Campolieti, suggest a strong link
between musculoskeletal disorders and moral
hazard. Consideration of this fact and the
already established link between the recent inci-
dences of worker absenteeism and muscu-
loskeletal disorders suggest moral hazard as a
contributing factor to these trends in Sweden.
The coincidence of a sickness insurance bene-
fit increase in 1998, the first of its kind in over
a decade, also prompts similar consideration.
Both instances support the need for identifying
moral hazard phenomena as a contributing fac-
tor to Swedish worker absenteeism trends. 
Conclusion
I have set out to explore moral hazard as a
contributing factor to the incidence of Swedish
worker absenteeism. First, I presented a detailed
review of the structure of the Swedish social
insurance system and the nature of moral haz-
ard to set the context for such an exploration.
Second, through an investigation of available
research, moral hazard phenomena are seen to
contribute to the incidence of worker absen-
teeism in both past and present. My investiga-
tion establishes the need for consideration of
moral hazard phenomena when explaining
trends in worker absenteeism in Sweden. A clos-
er examination of absenteeism increases since
1998 demonstrates how such consideration
could be applied to current conditions. 
Many explorations of worker absenteeism
trends in Sweden have steered clear of candid-
ly identifying moral hazard as a contributing
factor. Swedish policymakers and researchers
can now “connect the dots” between available
evidence and attempt to evaluate objectively the
role of moral hazard in determining worker
absenteeism. Culturally, this will not be an
effortless task, as a wonderfully generous
atmosphere of worker-protection and social jus-
tice permeates the Swedish system. Equally dif-
ficult will be the implementation of any new
policy designed to reduce insurance claims due
to moral hazard — a vastly encompassing social
benefits program is a hallmark of the Swedish
tradition. In fact, when discussing insurance
and moral hazard, it is easy to identify large
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benefit cutbacks as a solution to moral hazard.
In certain respects this seems logical; a
removal of insurance incentives will conse-
quently remove the behavior driven by those
incentives. One must approach this with cau-
tion, however. To some degree the very pur-
pose of the Swedish social insurance program
is to afford citizens the right to certain behav-
ioral changes; workers are relieved of having
to work while seriously ill or physically inca-
pacitated. The economic punishments of such
conditions are, by design, alleviated. This
reduction of necessary hardship in daily life is
why the welfare state exists. An overzealous
tightening of insurance benefits to reduce
moral hazard incentives could thus undermine
the very purpose of the Swedish social insur-
ance system. On the contrary, the results of a
more active consideration of moral hazard phe-
nomena, by providing a more complete under-
standing of the worker absenteeism implica-
tions of social insurance policies, should lend
insight as how to best preserve this tradition
in the future. 
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